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Abstract—In this paper a novel approach to co-design con-
troller and attack detector for nonlinear cyber-physical systems
affected by false data injection (FDI) attack is proposed. We
augment the model predictive controller with an additional con-
straint requiring the future—in some steps ahead—trajectory
of the system to remain in some time-invariant neighborhood
of a properly designed reference trajectory. At any sampling
time, we compare the real-time trajectory of the system with
the designed reference trajectory, and construct a residual.
The residual is then used in a nonparametric cumulative sum
(CUSUM) anomaly detector to uncover FDI attacks on input
and measurement channels. The effectiveness of the proposed
approach is tested with a nonlinear model regarding level
control of coupled tanks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial cyber-physical systems play a crucial rule in
critical infrastructures and everyday life. Cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPSs) are constituted of physical processes (plants)
communication and computation. Some examples of CPS
include power grids, intelligent transportation systems, water
distribution systems, aerospace systems, retail supply chain,
etc. which are all based on safety critical processes [3]. Both
cyber and physical components of a CPS are vulnerable
to malicious attacks. Security of CPSs is of paramount
importance to societies and governments. This importance
has fueled a considerable research in the recent past; see
survey papers [3], [4], [6], [7], [9], [20] and references
therein. In general there are two possible approaches in attack
detection: i) Information Technology (IT) based methods,
and ii) Physics-based (Control-based) methods. Due to the
presence of physical components in CPS, the states of the
system need to follow strict rules of nature, e.g. laws of
physics. For instance, in a power grid, voltage of buses and
current flowing through lines need to follow Kirchhoff’s
circuit laws. This important feature can be exploited to
detect attacks in CPSs. In this paper, we focus on physics-
based attack detection; hence, from now onward by attack
detection, we imply physics-based attack detection. Although
attacks can be complicated from an IT viewpoint, they tend to
be rather naı¨ve or unsophisticated from a control prospective
[19].
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Most attack detection methods are observer-based tech-
niques in which an observer is designed to estimate states
of the plant. The estimated state is then compared against
the actual value (measured by sensors) and a time-series
residual is formed. Then, an anomaly detector is used to
decide—based on the residual time series—on the presence
of an adversary agent having access to the control signal
and/or measurement output [1]. The observer can be static
or dynamic; for instance, the phase angle estimator in power
grids is a static estimator [10]. Attack detection strategies
can be broadly divided into two categories: active and
passive. Passive strategies are those in which the detection
mechanism does not affect the system. On the other hand,
active strategies affect the control system by sending some
unpredictable control commands and observing if sensors
react as predicted. In [15] a physical watermarking based
detection mechanism is presented in which a random noise
of known distribution is injected to the plant and a stateful
anomaly detector is used to detect attacks on the system.
In most attack detectors, the control and attack detection
designs are carried out independently: the controller is de-
signed first and, subsequently, the detection mechanism is
formulated. Contrary, in this paper we co-design these two
critical components and propose a joint control and attack
detection mechanism using elements from model predictive
control (MPC). MPC is an optimization-based controller
which can handle different state and control input constraints.
The control signal at each sampling time is the solution
of a constrained discrete-time optimal control problem [8],
[14], [17]. For linear time-invariant systems, the resulting
optimization problem is convex which can therefore be
efficiently solved using standard solvers. If the dynamical
systems is nonlinear—such as the one considered in this
paper, the MPC optimization problem becomes nonconvex.
We augment the standard MPC problem with an additional
constraint which restricts the future state/output trajectory
to remain within some time-invariant neighborhood of a
carefully designed reference trajectory. The minimization
of the MPC optimization problem involves the predicted
states as well as inputs over the prediction horizon. The
first component of the control vector is applied to the plant
and the predicted outputs are used to construct the future
reference trajectory. In fact, the reference trajectory at time
k is the N th component of the predicted trajectory provided
as the minimizer of the MPC problem at time k−N where N
is the prediction horizon. The difference between actual real-
time output and the reference output trajectory is stored in a
residual time-series. The residual is used in a non-parametric
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2cumulative sum (CUSUM) anomaly detector to decide on the
presence of attack in control signal or measurement output.
A. Related Literature
While the literature on attack detection is vast (see e.g.
[16]) few works are based on a model predictive control
design approach. In [2], the authors adopt a model-based
approach in order to detect cyber-attacks in a linear system
equipped with a model predictive controller. The problem
is formalized as a binary hypothesis test. However, the
MPC structure is assumed to be given, and no co-design
is considered. A recent and interesting line of research is the
one based on the design of set-theoretic receding-horizon
control schemes, see for instance [12], [13]. In these works,
a specific control architecture is designed so as to be able to
detect and mitigate cyber-attacks affecting CPSs. In [22], an
idea based on the concept of a receding-horizon control law
is presented to mitigate replay attacks. In particular, stability
is proved under some assumptions on the horizon length and
the attack duration. The idea can also be used with false
data injection attacks. An MPC-based attack detector using
limit checking is introduced in [18]. A feasibility problem
is solved online and if there does not exist a control vector
being able to keep states within their safe limit during the
predicted horizon, an attack is declared. We remark that all
reviewed approaches are applied to linear systems, while in
this paper we consider a nonlinear setup.
B. The sequel
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we formulate the nonlinear MPC problem. The
modified MPC problem along with proposed attack detec-
tion methodology are presented in Section III. A numerical
example of industrial cyber-physical systems is presented in
Section IV and some concluding remarks are reported in
Section V.
Notations
Lowercase letters are used for vectors and uppercase ones
for matrices. The symbol X  0 (resp. X  0) is used to
denote a positive (resp. positive semi-definite) matrix X . The
set N>0 denotes the set of positive integers. While yk denotes
the measured output at time k, the output predicted ` steps
ahead at time k is denoted as y`|k. We use uN |k to denote the
sequence of length N of vectors u0|k, . . . , uN−1|k; the same
notation is used for output vector yN |k. The Minkowski sum
of A and B is denoted by A⊕B = {a+ b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a nonlinear cyber-physical system (CPS) whose
dynamics is governed by the nonlinear discrete-time system
xk+1 =f(xk, (uk + u
a
k)), (1a)
yk =xk + y
a
k , (1b)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector of the system at sampling
time instant k, uk ∈ Rm is the control signal to be applied to
the system, uak ∈ Rm represents an attack signal applied to
the input at time k, f : Rn × Rm → Rn is a nonlinear map
which assigns to a state vector xk and control vector uk the
successor state xk+1, yk is the measurement signal at time k,
and yak is the attack signal at the output. We assume that all
states are available for feedback. The controller is spatially
distributed and the channels between controller-actuators and
sensors-controller are established by some communication
network, e.g. Internet or wireless, industrial Ethernet, Field-
bus, etc. We assume that malicious agents can gain access to
these communication channels by compromising the security
protocols, and as a consequence are able to inject their
desired signals uak and y
a
k to the system (1). The objective
is to design a model predictive controller for the system (1)
to be able to detect any possible attack on the control input
and measurement signals. In the MPC framework, we usually
restrict the output vector yk,∀k ∈ N>0 to live in a set Y.
This can be due to safety limitations; for example, the level
of liquid in a tank needs to be within its high and low limits
or furnace temperature should not exceed a predefined value.
Similarly, the control signal uk,∀k ∈ N>0 is also required to
remain in a set U which is to prevent any actuator saturation.
The desired performance of the MPC controller is granted
by the appropriate design of a cost function used in the
optimization problem being solved at each sampling time.
Assuming that 0 is the equilibrium point of the system—in
fact if [xT∗ , u
T
∗ ]
T 6= 0 is the equilibrium point of the system
(1), we can replace f(xk, uk) by (f(xk +x∗, uk +u∗)−x∗)
so to have 0 as the equilibrium point—the cost function
`(x, u) : Y× U→ R>0 penalizes the distance of the output
yk and control input uk to the equilibrium point. A terminal
cost is added to the cost function to ensure that the MPC
policy stabilizes the system. With these ingredients in mind,
we use the following finite-horizon cost to be minimized at
time k
`N (yN+1|k,uN |k) =
N−1∑
j=0
(
yTj|kQyj|k + u
T
j|kRuj|k
)
+ VN (yk+N ), (2)
where Q ∈ Rn×n, Q  0, R ∈ Rm×m, R  0 and VN (y) is
the terminal cost designed based on the Lyapunov stability
theory, see [8, Chapter 5] for further details. A terminal
constraint of the form yN |k ∈ Yf is also included in the MPC
optimization problem to guarantee stability. The terminal
set Yf is designed to grant stability to the MPC policy.
With these notations, in an attack-free scenario the MPC
optimization problem being solved at time k is
min
yN+1|k,uN|k
`N (yN+1|k,uN |k) (3a)
subject to: xj+1|k = f(xj|k, uj|k), x0|k = xk
yk = xk
yj|k ∈ Y, j ∈ [1, N ]
uj|k ∈ U, j ∈ [0, N − 1]
yN |k ∈ Yf . (3b)
Denoting the minimizer of optimization problem (3) with
3(y∗1|k, . . . , y
∗
N |k, u
∗
0|k, . . . , u
∗
N−1|k), the MPC control law is
uk = u
∗
0|k, meaning that only the first element of the optimal
control signal is applied to the system. The formulated MPC
problem (3) is for an attack-free scenario, i.e. uak = y
a
k =
0,∀k ∈ N>0. In the next section, we propose a modified
MPC problem along with a detection criterion which is able
to detect possible attacks on system (1).
III. ATTACK DETECTION ALGORITHM
We first discuss the class of attacks considered in this
paper, and then present the modified MPC controller and,
finally the detection procedure. Here, we specifically con-
sider the class of False Data Injection Attacks (FDI). In an
FDI attack, an attacker augments control and measurement
signals with his/her desired arbitrary data by manipulating
uak and y
a
k . Regarding the FDI attack we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 1: The attacker can modify control and mea-
surement signals by injecting its desired signals uak, y
a
k ;
however, it cannot access both control and measurement
channels at the same time, i.e. @k : (uak 6= 0)&(yak 6= 0).
Assumption 1 is important because if the attacker has access
to the model of the system and is able to modify both control
and measurement signals, he/she can design attack signals
uak and y
a
k such that the attack remains covert, see [19] for
further details.
A. Modified MPC Algorithm
Attack detection algorithms reported in the literature are
usually independent from the controller design process. Typ-
ically, the controller is designed first, and subsequently the
detection algorithm is formulated. In this paper, however,
we take a novel approach by co-designing the detection
algorithm and the controller. To this end, at each time k
we consider a future reference trajectory y˜j|k, j ∈ [1, N ].
This constitutes a key ingredient of our approach, and is
formally defined later. Next, we add an extra constraint to
the MPC optimization requiring the actual output trajectory
yj|k, j ∈ [1, N ] to remain within a specified time-invariant
neighborhoods of the reference trajectory
yj|k ∈ y˜j|k ⊕ E , j ∈ [1, N ]. (4)
Therefore, the modified MPC problem to be solved at each
time k reads as
min
yN+1|k,uN|k
`N (yN+1|k,uN |k) (5a)
subject to: xj+1|k = f(xj|k, uj|k + aj+k), x0|k = xk
yj|k ∈ Y, j ∈ [1, N ]
yj|k ∈ y˜j|k ⊕ E , j ∈ [1, N ]
uj|k ∈ U, j ∈ [0, N − 1]
yN |k ∈ Yf . (5b)
The motivation behind forcing the real-time output to re-
main within some time-invariant neighborhood of a reference
trajectory originates from the distributed model predictive
control literature, and in particular, [5]. In [5] authors con-
sider a distributed scenario where states and control inputs
of each node of the network affects the neighboring nodes.
Specifically, each node of the network enforces its real-time
trajectory to stay within some time-invariant neighborhood
of a reference trajectory. Nodes of the network receive the
predicted state and control input of their neighbors and
solve their local MPC problem by relying on the predicted
trajectories. Solution of the optimization problem defined
in (5), i.e. (y∗1|k, . . . , y
∗
N |k, u
∗
0|k, . . . , u
∗
N−1|k), involves pre-
dicted outputs (y∗1|k, . . . , y
∗
N |k). This information can be used
as the predicted reference trajectory y˜j|k. In fact, the refer-
ence trajectory at time k +N, y˜k+N is the N th component
of the predicted output trajectory provided as the minimizer
of the MPC problem (5) at time k, y∗k+N |k
y˜k+N = y
∗
k+N |k.
Therefore, by solving the MPC optimization (5), we gradu-
ally construct the reference trajectory.
The set E defines the closeness of the actual trajectory to
the future reference trajectory. Requiring the two trajectories
to be very close may result in a conservative control strat-
egy with poor performance. There is therefore trade-off in
selecting the set E . Selecting a very small E compromises the
performance of the MPC control strategy while very large E
leads to poor security.
B. Anomaly Detector
Anomaly detectors construct a series of residuals based
on which they decide on the occurrence of an attack on
dynamical systems. In observer-based anomaly detectors,
the residual is the difference between the actual states
(or outputs) and the estimated ones. In this paper, on the
contrary, we use as residual the difference between real-
time output yk and the reference output trajectory y˜k. Two
types of detector are usually adopted in the literature: i)
stateless, and ii) stateful. In a stateless test, if the residual
rk
.
= ‖yk − y˜k‖ exceeds some threshold γ, an attack is
declared. Contrary, in a stateful test, which is a statistical
test, a new statistic Sk is constructed, which keeps track
of the residuals. There are a number of stateful anomaly
detectors in the literature, such as simple averaging over
a time window, exponential weighted moving average and,
non-parametric cumulative sum known as CUSUM. In this
paper, we adopt CUSUM statistic due to its popularity and
effectiveness. The CUSUM statistic Sk is defined recursively
as S0 = 0 and Sk+1 = max(0, Sk+rk−δ), where δ is chosen
such that it prevents the CUSUM statistic to grow constantly
in an attack-free scenario. An attack is declared if Sk exceeds
the threshold γ. Then, the CUSUM statistic is restarted, i.e.
Sk+1 = 0. The threshold γ is usually selected by performing
extensive simulations. In fact, a small threshold may result
in frequent false positives while a large value of γ can lead
to a detecting mechanism ignoring attacks.
The control and attack detection algorithm is reported in
Algorithm 1. At each sampling time, we first receive the
actual measurement yk from the plant and construct the
4Algorithm 1 Control and Anomaly Detection Algorithm
1: Input: f,N, E , γ, δ, y0
2: Output: attack
Initialization:
3: Construct a feasible reference trajectory y˜1|0, . . . , y˜N |0
and set k = 0, attack = 0, S0 = 0
Evolution:
4: while attack == 0 do
5: Receive yk from the plant
6: Sk+1 = max(0, Sk + ‖yk − y˜k‖ − δ)
7: if Sk+1 > γ then
8: Set attack = 1
9: return attack
10: end if
11: Solve the modified MPC problem (5)
12: Set y˜k+N = y∗k+N |k
13: Set uk = u∗0|k and transmit uk to the plant
14: end while
CUSUM statistic Sk+1. If Sk+1 exceeds a carefully chosen
threshold γ, an attack is declared. Next, the modified MPC
problem (5) is solved, the reference trajectory is constructed
y˜k+N = y
∗
k+N |k and, the control signal uk = u
∗
0|k is
transmitted and applied to the plant.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We ran extensive simulations to check the effectiveness of
the presented approach. In particular, we tested the algorithm
on a nonlinear system regarding level control of two coupled
tank systems.
A. Level Control of Coupled Tanks
The schematic diagram of this system is shown in Fig. 1.
The fluid is pumped form a reservoir into the top tank. There
is an opening at the bottom of the tank which allows the
drainage of the fluid to the second tank. Similarly, due to
the opening in the second tank, the fluid returns back into
the reservoir. The goal is to control the fluid level in both
tanks by manipulating the pump that connects the reservoir
and Tank 1. The system dynamics can be computed using
the conservation of mass and Bernoulli’s equation
dh1
dt
=
c1
ρA1
u− c2
ρA1
√
h1, (6)
dh2
dt
=
c2
ρA2
√
h1 − c2
ρA2
√
h2,
where h = [h1, h2]T is the state vector containing the level
of liquid in the first and second tank respectively, ρ is the
density of the fluid, A1, A2 are the cross-sectional area of
tanks 1 and 2 respectively, c1, c2 are coefficients related
to the tanks opening, and, u is the pump rate. There are
a number of ways to discretize the continuous model (6).
Here, we use the first-order forward Euler approximation
to construct a discrete-time model. To this end, selecting a
ℎ"
ℎ#
Reservoir
Tank 1
Tank 2
Controller 
&
Attack 
Detector
𝑢
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the two coupled tanks system. The exchange
of information between sensors/controller and controller/actuator are subject
to false data injection attack. Levels of the two tanks are sensed and
transmitted to the controller using level transmitters. The control signal is
computed in the controller and then transmitted to the flow control valve to
regulate the flow of liquid.
desired sampling time T , the discretized model is
h1(k + 1) =h1(k) + T
(
α1u(k)− α2
√
h1(k)
)
, (7)
h2(k + 1) =h2(k) + T
(
α2
(√
h1(k)−
√
h2(k)
))
,
where—assuming identical tanks—α1 = 1.75 and α2 =
0.1544. We remark that more sophisticated discretization
method such as Runge–Kutta can be used which results in
a more complex discrete dynamics and consequently a more
complex MPC optimization problem, see [8, Chapter 11].
The objective is to design an MPC controller to control the
level of tank 2 at 0.95. The saturation level of flow control
valve is set to 1 which means the following constraint on the
control signal should hold all the time
0 ≤ u(k) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ N>0.
In order to prevent any overflow in both tanks, we require
the fluid level h(k) to remain below 1. Hence, the following
state constraint should be respected all the time[
0
0
]
≤ h(k) ≤
[
1
1
]
,∀k ∈ N>0.
The MPC framework formulated in Section II is for regu-
lation problems. To consider a tracking problem, the cost
needs to be modified as
`N (hN+1|k,uN |k) =
N−1∑
j=0
(
(hj|k−h¯j|k)TQ(hj|k−h¯j|k)+uTj|kRuj|k
)
+VN (hk+N ),
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Fig. 2. Scenario in which the reading form the level sensor reporting
liquid level in Tank 1 is compromised starting from time t = 50 sec. The
top figure shows both the actual, as well as the deceived liquid levels in
Tank 1. The bottom figure presents the liquid level at Tank 2. A simple
false data injection attack causes both tanks to overflow.
where h¯j|k is a reference signal that output hj|k has to follow.
The constraint (4) in this example is chosen to be
‖hj|k − h˜j|k‖2 < 0.01, j ∈ [1, N ]. (8)
In fact, the real-time trajectory at time k is required to remain
in an `2-ball of radius 0.01 centered at the the reference
trajectory at time k. Other measures such as the infinity
norm can also be used. The non-convex MPC optimization
problem is formulated in YALMIP [11] and solved using the
interior point algorithm embedded in the fmincon solver
[21].
We first consider data injection attack on sensors. In
particular, we assume that attacker has access to the level
sensor installed at Tank 1. We assume that the attacker’s
goal is to deceive the controller to inject too much fluid
in the two tanks causing them to overflow. To this end, the
attacker can subtract a positive value from the sensor reading
to encourage the controller injecting more fluid into the
system leading to an overflow. To show that if no detection
mechanism is used, the attacker can easily lead the system
to an unsafe region, we consider an FDI attack shown in Fig.
2. Assuming that both tanks are empty at time k = 0, i.e.
h1(0) = h2(0) = 0, the objective of MPC controller is to fill
Tank 2 and keep its liquid level at 0.8. We remark that at this
stage the proximity constraint (8) is not incorporated in the
MPC optimization problem. The attacker starts sending false
data at time k = 500—corresponding to t = 50 sec—which
deceives the controller forcing it to inject more fluid into the
system and eventually causes both tanks to overflow. This
simple scenario reveals that the system without a detection
mechanism is vulnerable to FDI attacks.
To show the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we
add the proximity constraint (8) to the MPC optimization
problem and use the anomaly detector reported in Section III
to detect the attack. In particular, we use the CUSUM
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Fig. 3. Scenario in which the reading from the level sensor reporting
liquid level in Tank 1 is compromised starting from time t = 50 sec. The
top figure shows the actual level of both tanks. The bottom figure shows the
residual ‖y(k) − y˜(k)‖2 as well as CUSUM statistic. Once the CUSUM
statistic exceeds 0.1, the attack is detected in the system. The inset shows
a zoomed-in view of both residuals and CUSUM from t = 0 to t = 5.6
sec. It is clear that the residual does not exceed γ = 0.01 meaning that
constraint (8) is respected in the absence of attack.
anomaly detector
S0 = 0, Sk+1 = max(0, Sk + ‖y(k)− y˜(k)‖2 − 0.01),
where yk is the (deceived) sensors measurement at time k
and y˜k is the predicted value of the levels at time k. Figure
3 shows both residual ‖y(k) − y˜(k)‖2 as well as CUSUM
statistic. We remark that the same FDI attack scenario as the
one reported in Fig. 2 is used to evaluate the effectiveness
of the detection mechanism. The detection threshold—the
parameter γ in Algorithm 1—is selected to be 0.1. As it can
be seen from the inset in Fig. 3, the residual ‖y(k)− y˜(k)‖2
remains bellow 0.01 meaning that the proximity constraint
(8) is respected in the absence of any attack. Starting from
t = 50 sec, the residual starts to increase resulting in an
increase in the CUSUM statistic. At t = 5.92 sec, the
CUSUM statistic exceeds 0.1 and the FDI attack is detected.
Any sensor measurement inevitably carries some noise. To
see the effect of noise on the performance of the proposed
detection mechanism, we add a white Gaussian noise with
zero mean and 0.002 standard deviation to the sensor mea-
surement from both Tanks 1 and 2. The simulation reported
in Fig. 4 shows that the presence of noise does not have
a negative effect on the performance, hence confirming the
robustness to noise of the proposed approach.
We next consider an FDI attack on the control input u.
A simulation reporting an attack on the control signal is
shown in Fig. 5. The attacker compromises the control signal
applied to the system and augment the actual control signal
u(k) with an attack signal ua(k)—shown in the bottom graph
in Fig. 5. We remark that a smaller attack signal cannot bring
the system to an unsafe region and hence is automatically
rejected using the MPC controller. Specifically, if the attack
signal on the control input is small, the MPC controller is
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Fig. 4. Same scenario as the one in Fig. 3, but in the presence of added
white Gaussian noise. The performance of the controller/detector is not
affected by noise.
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Fig. 5. Scenario in which the control input signal is compromised. In
particular, the actual control signal u(k) is replaced with u(k) + ua(k)
where ua(k) is the attack signal showed in the bottom graph. The attack
signal is started at t = 50 sec and detected at t = 6.9 sec.
able to reject it by manipulating its designed control signal
u(k) and hence the attack signal will not have an adverse
effect on the performance of the controlled system.
V. CONCLUSION
An approach to co-design a controller controlling the
system and an attack detector to detect false data injection
attacks in control inputs and measurements is reported in
this paper. In a model predictive controller framework, we
consider a nonlinear system and require the future trajectory
of the outputs to remain in some time-invariant neighborhood
of a reference trajectory. Deviation of the real-time trajectory
form the reference trajectory—at any point in time—is con-
sidered as a residual and used in a non-parametric cumulative
sum (CUSUM) anomaly detector to detect attacks.
Future research considers extending the proposed ap-
proach to distributed industrial control systems.
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